In a November, 1971 classic article in PSYCHOLOGY TODAY,
U.S.
psychologist Dr. Irving Janis introduced the term "groupthink"
into the
vocabulary of behavioural science. He used the term in trying to account
for why so many obviously foolish U.S. foreign policy decisions had
come
from the White House over the previous 30 years. These decisions resulted
in the Pearl Harbor debacle, the Korean War stalemate, the Bay of
Pigs
fiasco, and the utter tragedy of the Viet Nam war then taking place.
Is the situation any different now considering the U.S.
debacle of
the war in Iraq and the not very secret decision to wage a war in
Iran in
the not-too-distant future.
According to Dr. Janis "groupthink" is "the
mode of thinking that
persons engage in when concurrence-seeking becomes so dominant in
a
cohesive in-group that it tends to override realistic appraisal of
alternative courses of action." He adds, "the term refers
to a
deterioration in mental efficiency, reality testing and moral judgments
as
a result of group pressures."
Like some invisible cancer, when leaders and advisers
suffer from
groupthink, the results can be terminal--often long before anyone
realizes
there is any problem at all.
But like cancer, groupthink has clear danger signals
for those
wise enough to be aware. Dr. Janis writes that groupthink sets in
"when
the members of decision-making groups become motivated to avoid being
too
harsh in their judgments of their leaders' or their colleagues'
ideas. They adopt a soft line of criticism, even in their own
thinking. At their meetings, all the members are amiable and seek
complete
concurrence on every important issue, with no bickering or conflict
to
spoil the cozy, `we-feeling' atmosphere."
In fact, in his article, Dr. Janis describes the "eight
main
symptoms of groupthink".
-
Invulnerability. Those afflicted with groupthink
in an advisory
group share an illusion of invulnerability. This makes them believe
that
they can take great risks without being hurt and they ignore warnings.
-
Rationale. Groupthinkers also collectively construct
rationalizations in order to insulate themselves from warnings and
other
forms of negative feedback.
-
Morality. Groupthinkers believe unquestionably in
the inherent
morality of their in-group. This belief inclines members to ignore
laws,
proper business or government practice, and ethical consequences
of their
decisions.
-
Stereotypes. Groupthinkers hold stereotypes of opponents--often
deluding themselves into thinking them weak, stupid, and ineffectual.
-
Pressure. Groupthinkers apply direct pressure to
any individual
who momentarily expresses doubts about any of the group's shared
illusions
or who questions the validity of the arguments supporting a policy
alternative favoured by the majority. Dr. Janis writes, "this
gambit
reinforces the concurrence-seeking norm that loyal members are expected
to
maintain."
-
Self-censorship. Groupthinkers avoid deviating from
what appears
to be group consensus. They keep silent about their misgivings and
even
minimize to themselves the importance of their doubts.
-
Unanimity. Groupthinkers share an illusion of unanimity
within the
group concerning almost all judgements expressed by members who
speak in
favour of the majority view. Dr. Janis notes that around the meeting
table
of groupthinkers there is "the false assumption that any individual
who
remains silent during any part of the discussion is in full accord
with
what the others are saying."
-
Mindguards. Dr. Janis writes that groupthinkers
"sometimes appoint
themselves as mind guards to protect the leader and fellow members
from
adverse information that might break the complacency they shared
about the
effectiveness and morality of past decisions."
But groupthink also can be prevented, treated, even eliminated
altogether. Dr. Janis suggests nine means of therapy.
-
The leader of a policy-forming group should assign
the role of
critical evaluator to each member, encouraging the group to give
high
priority to open airing of objections and doubts.
-
When the key members of a hierarchy assign a policy-planning
mission to any group within their organization, they should adopt
an
impartial stance instead of stating preferences and expectations
at the
beginning.
-
The organization routinely should set up several
outside
policy-planning and evaluation groups to work on the same policy
question,
each deliberating under a different leader.
-
The leader should require each member to discuss
the group's
deliberations with associates in their own unit of the organization
at
intervals before the group reaches a final consensus.
-
The group should invite one or more outside experts
to each meeting
on a staggered basis and encourage the experts to challenge the
views of
the core members.
-
At every general meeting of the group, whenever
the agenda calls
for an evaluation of policy alternatives, at least one member should
play
devil's advocate--challenging those who advocate the majority position.
-
Whenever the policy issue involves relations with
opponents, the
group should devote a sizable block of time to a survey of all warning
signals from the opponents, especially with respect to the intentions
of
rivals.
-
When the group is surveying policy alternatives
for feasibility and
effectiveness, it should from time to time divide into two or more
subgroups to meet separately, under a different chairperson, and
then
re-convene to hammer out differences.
-
After reaching a preliminary consensus about what
seems to be the
best policy, the group should hold a "second-chance" meeting
at which time
every member expresses "as vividly as possible" any and
all of their
residual doubts. They then rethink the entire issue before making
a
definitive choice.
Whether or not groupthink was involved in the fall from power of
our former high flyers is known only to them and their advisers. But
leaders should learn that preventing groupthink produces better advice,
results in better decisions, and ensures better health and longer
life to
the group and its leader. If not before, hopefully, we will all know
it now.
And knowledge is power.